INTRODUCTION
The Bhopal disaster was an industrial disaster that
occurred in the city of Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India,
resulting in the immediate deaths of more than 3,000
people, according to the Indian Supreme Court. A more
probable figure is that 8,000 died within two weeks, and
it is estimated that the same number have since died from
gas related diseases.
The incident took place in the early hours of the morning
of December 3, 1984, in the heart of the city of Bhopal in
the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. A Union Carbide
subsidiary pesticide plant released 42 tonnes of methyl
isocyanate (MIC) gas, exposing at least 520,000 people to
toxic gases. The Bhopal disaster is frequently cited as
the world’s worst industrial disaster. The International
Medical Commission on Bhopal was established in 1993 to
respond to the disasters.
TRAGEDY
In the early hours of December 3, 1984, on what was a
bracing winter morning, mixed with the winter breeze, was
a highly toxic grey cloud that was emerging from the Union
Carbide ‘C’ factory. This poisonous substance, stored in
tank number 610 of the factory was later found to be
Methyl Isocynate (MIC), which had got contaminated with
water. According to experts, MIC is considered to be an
extremely reactive chemical and is used to produce
insecticides. When water got mixed with this MIC, an
exothermal chemical reaction started which resulted in a
lot of heat being produced. As the pressure in the tank
built up beyond safe levels, the safety valve burst open
violently and the gas leaked. As around forty tons of this
gas spread through the city, there was no alarm or any
kind to warn the inhabitants of this populous town. Since
the gas leaked out from a 30 meter chimney, it was not
high enough for the people to escape the effects. Later
studies have shown that the effect of this toxic gas was
especially harsh because of the high moisture content in
the gas, which when exposed, started evaporating and being
a heavy gas, the gas started moving downwards. The
movement of the wind was also such that the gas spread
through the city much faster than it otherwise would have.
BACKGROUND, SUMMARY & CAUSES
The Union Carbide India, Limited (UCIL) plant was
established in 1969. 51% was owned by Union Carbide
Corporation (UCC) and 49% by Indian authorities. It
produced the pesticide carbaryl (trade mark Sevin).
Methyl isocyanate (MIC), an intermediate in carbaryl
manufacture, was used instead of less toxic but more
expensive materials. UCC was well aware of the substance’s
properties and how it had to be handled.
In 1979, a plant for producing MIC was added to the UCIL
plant. UCC was responsible for all technique and design.
The plant was located close to a densely populated area,
instead of on the other side of the town where UCIL was
offered an area. MIC was stored in a few large tanks
instead of several small tanks.
During the night of December 3rd 1984, large amounts of
water entered tank 610, containing 42 tonnes of methyl
isocyanate. The resulting reaction generated a major
increase in the temperature of liquid inside the tank to
over 400°F (200°C). The MIC holding tank then gave off a
large volume of toxic gas, forcing the emergency release
of pressure. The reaction was sped up by the presence of
iron from corroding non-stainless steel pipelines.
There have been several theories on the reason for the
entry of water into the tank. The workers claim that,
because of the bad maintenance with leaking valves etc, it
was possible for the water to climb from the point where
the pipeline washing was performed to tank 610. UCC
maintains that this was not possible, and that it was an
act of sabotage by a “disgruntled worker” who introduced
water directly into the tank.
The two most important factors leading to the mega-gas
leak were plant design (using hazardous chemicals instead
of less dangerous, storing in large tanks, possible
corroding material in pipelines etc), and the economic
pressure and cutting back on expences (reduction of staff,
safety systems not functioning etc). Factors deciding the
outcome of the leakage were location near a densely
populated area, non-existing catastrophe plan,
shortcomings in health care and socio-economic
rehabilitation etc. Analysis shows that the parties
responsible for the magnitude of the disaster are the two
owners, Union Carbide Corporation and the Government of
India, and to some extent, the Government of Madhya
Pradesh.
EFFECTS
Within hours, the streets of Bhopal were littered with
human corpses and the carcasses of buffaloes, cows, dogs
and birds. An estimated 3,800 people died immediately,
mostly in the poor slum colony adjacent to the Union
Carbide plant. Local hospitals were soon inundated with
patients, a crisis further complicated by a lack of
knowledge of exactly what gas was involved, what its
effects were and what the possible cure could be. Since
the incident took place on a cold night when most of the
people where indoors, they woke up with a burning
sensation in their eyes. They rushed outdoors only to
breathe greater concentrations of the gas and in panic as
they ran, breathing even greater volumes of the gas,
ultimately choking themselves to death. Eventually the
death toll rose to more than 20,000 people with more than
5,00,000 people being affected directly and indirectly and
many more thousands of families were permanently affected
for generations. Two decades later, more than a few lakhs
of people are still suffering from the debilitating
effects of the gas which includes respiratory problems,
cancer, congenital birth defects, blindness and many other
diseases. Every year since then, scores more are still
dying in Bhopal from the various after effects. Some of
the symptoms of Methyl Isocynate contamination include
cough, dyspnea or disorder of the lungs, chest pain
leading to acute lung failure, cardiac arrest and death.
It has resulted in many children being born with genetic
defects and mutations and mental retardation. It has also
had a long term impact on the reproductive cycle of
affected women and the quality of their breast milk.
Besides the effects on people, according to
environmentalists, the impact it has had on the ecology of
that area is also far reaching. There are still hundreds
of tonnes of toxic waste alone, which could lead to a
continuous poisoning of the soil as well as ground water.
Some areas in and around that area are still so polluted
that someone entering that area is likely to lose
consciousness in less than ten minutes.
AFTER – EFFECTS
Investigations into the tragedy showed that there were
many shortcomings at all levels. The Union Carbide factory
did not have much information about the safe storage of
these highly toxic gases. The medical fraternity did not
have the requisite know how to deal with such kind of
contamination and at this scale. There was a lack of
co-ordination between the factory and emergency services.
There were not many trained professionals in that factory.
Cost cutting had also had its impact on the safety of the
plant, its employees and the people living around the
plant. The plant was also in a densely populated area of
the city which went against most known norms.
The Union Carbide factory closed down their operation in
Bhopal following the tragedy, but they did not do a proper
clean up of the site due to which it is a bio-hazardous
zone even today. This lapse has resulted in, what many
environmentalists claim, a slow and sustained pollution of
the area within and around the closed factory.
After decades of court cases and arguments and
investigations, though compensation has been paid to many
of the victims, it is not enough and there is still a
strong sense of injustice that lingers in the air. Though
a compensation of nearly 470 million USD has been called
for, it is undoubtedly a small amount based on the long
term health consequences of exposure and the number of
people affected. More than twenty years of passiveness has
taken its toll. Many are calling it the world’s biggest
humanitarian disaster. Indirectly it has lead to massive
unemployment, destitution and widespread psychological
problems in the people.
DISASTER BECAUSE OF DESIGN
Bhopal is not only a disaster, but a corporate crime. It
began as a classic instance of corporate double-standards:
Union Carbide was obliged to install state-of-the-art
technology in Bhopal, but instead used inferior and
unproven technology and employed lax operating procedures
and maintenance and safety standards compared to those
used in its US ‘sister-plant’. The motive was not simply
profit, but also control: the company saved $8 million,
and through this deliberate under-investment managed to
retain a majority share of its Indian subsidiary. It
should have come as no surprise to Carbide’s management
when its factory began to pose a chronic threat to its own
workers and to the people living nearby.
On December 25, 1981, a leak of phosgene killed one
worker, Ashraf Khan, at the plant and severely injured two
others. On January 9, 1982, twenty five workers were
hospitalized as a result of another leak at the plant.
During the “safety week” proposed by management to address
worker grievances about the Bhopal facility, repeated
incidents of such toxic leakage took place and workers
took the opportunity to complain directly to the American
management officials present. In the wake of these
incidents, workers at the plant demanded hazardous duty
pay scales commensurate with the fact that they were
required to handle hazardous substances. These requests
were denied. Yet another leak on October 5, 1982 affected
hundreds of nearby residents requiring hospitalization of
large numbers of people residing in the communities
surrounding the plant. After the release – which included
quantities of MIC, hydrochloric acid and chloroform – the
worker’s union printed hundreds of posters which they
distributed throughout the community, warning:
• “Beware of Fatal Accidents”
• “Lives of thousands of workers and citizens in danger
because of poisonous gas”
• “Spurt of accidents in the factory, safety measures
deficient.”
Opposition legislators raised the issue in the State
Assembly and the clamor surrounding these incidents
culminated in a 1983 motion that urged the state
government to force the company to relocate the plant to a
less-populated area. Starting in 1982, a local journalist
named Rajkumar Keswani had frantically tried to warn
people of the dangers posed by the facility. In September
of 1982, he wrote an article entitled “Please Save this
City.” Other articles, written later, bore grimly
prophetic titles such as “Bhopal Sitting on Top of a
Volcano” and “If You Do Not Understand This You Will Be
Wiped Out.” Just five months before the tragedy, he wrote
his final article: “Bhopal on the Brink of a Disaster.”
In the midst of this clamour, in May 1982, Union Carbide
sent a team of U.S. experts to inspect the Bhopal plant as
part of its periodic safety audits. This report, which was
forwarded to Union Carbide’s management in the United
States, speaks unequivocally of a “potential for the
release of toxic materials” and a consequent “runaway
reaction” due to “equipment failure, operating problems,
or maintenance problems.” In fact, the report goes on to
state rather specifically: “Deficiencies in safety valve
and instrument maintenance programs…. Filter cleaning
operations are performed without slip blinding process.
Leaking valves could create serious exposure during this
process.” In its report, the safety audit team noted a
total of 61 hazards, 30 of them major and 11 in the
dangerous phosgene/MIC units. It had warned of a “higher
potential for a serious incident or more serious
consequences if an accident should occur.” Though the
report was available to senior U.S. officials of the
company, nothing was done. In fact, according to Carbide’s
internal documents, a major cost-cutting effort (including
a reduction of 335 men) was undertaken in 1983, saving the
company $1.25 million that year.
Although MIC is a particularly reactive and deadly gas,
the Union Carbide plant’s safety systems were allowed to
fall into disrepair. Between 1983 and 1984, the safety
manuals were re-written to permit switching off the
refrigeration unit and shutting down the vent gas scrubber
when the plant was not in operation. Cost-cutting measures
directed by the Danbury Headquarters of Union Carbide
included reducing the MIC plant crew from 12 to 6. In the
control room, there was only 1 operator to monitor 70+
panels. Safety training was cut from 6 months to 15 days.
On the night of the deadly MIC leak, none of the safety
systems designed to prevent a leak – six in all – were
operational, and the plant siren had been turned off.
The process safety system included a design modification
installed in May 1984 on the say-so of US engineers. This
‘jumper line’, a cheap solution to a maintenance problem,
connected a relief valve header to a pressure vent header
and enabled water from a routine washing operation to pass
between the two, on through a pressure valve, and into MIC
storage tank 610. Carbide’s initial investigation agreed
that the pressure valve was leaking but declined to
mention the jumper line. Exposure to this water led to an
uncontrolled reaction; a deadly cloud of MIC, hydrogen
cyanide, mono methyl amine soon settled over much of
Bhopal, and people began to die.
A STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE
In the wake of the disaster, the survivors assembled to
fight for justice. In January 1985 a petition was
circulated by Mr. Syed Irfan, leader of the Bhopal Gas
Peedit Mahila Purush Sangarsh Morcha organization, and
other survivors addressing the heads of the Madhya Pradesh
government for medical and monetary aid.
Few people were healthy enough after the disaster to do
the sort of manual labor they had done beforehand. Many
needed to be taught new crafts. The Indian Government
initially set up lessons for survivors to learn trades,
but did not provide decent jobs. The women at one
stationary factory decided to unionize, forming the Bhopal
Gas Peedit Mahila Stationary Karamchari Sangh or “Bhopal
Gas-Affected Women’s Stationary Worker’s Union”. Led by
future Goldman Award Winners Rashida Bee and Champa Devi
Shukla, the union tried for months to negotiate with the
government for decent wages. Finally, they marched from
Bhopal to Delhi to petition the Prime Minister of India.
It took them thirty-three days to reach Delhi, and even
after having received some promises of support, little was
done. Although the BGPMSKS struggle lasted for more than a
decade, it was ultimately successful. Meanwhile, the union
became deeply involved in the broader campaign for justice
in Bhopal, becoming one of four key survivors
organizations to spearhead the International Campaign for
Justice in Bhopal.
Today, the International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal is
stronger than ever before. Within the past two years the
campaign has won several significant victories, improving
the lives and the condition of the people of Bhopal.
Despite the horror of the night of December 3, 1984 and
the chemical terror that its survivors have endured, the
people of Bhopal continue their struggle for justice, for
corporate accountability, and for their basic human right
to an environment free of chemical poisons. The outcome of
their struggle holds vast implications for all of us; if
corporations aren’t held accountable for their crimes,
they’re destined to be repeated. We all live in Bhopal.
The only memorial ever built in Bhopal was privately
funded, designed by the daughter of Holocaust victims. In
bold letters, the inscription reads, “No Hiroshima, No
Bhopal, We Want To Live.” With your help and that of
others, the justice that has been so long delayed in
Bhopal cannot be denied.
CONCLUSION
The disaster did pave the way for much stricter
international standards for environmental safety,
preventative strategies to avoid similar accidents and a
better state of preparedness to meet future industrial
disaster. In India, a number of changes were made in the
Indian Factories Act and environmental legislation. There
is a much better understanding of the fact that industries
need to apply good process safety management systems and
have efficient and safe handling and storage capacities of
individual reactive chemicals. Following the disaster,
environmental awareness and activism in India has
increased tremendously. It serves as a warning to
developing nations to create the right balance between
human, environmental and economic status on the path to
industrialization.